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Abstract 
We propose a method for measuring the conjectural errors that inexpert consumers make relative to experts in 
using observable product characteristics as surrogate indicators of a valued unobservable characteristic. 
Observations on the unobservable characteristic, available to the researcher but not consumers, are used to divide 
the data into high- and low-quality subsamples. Separate hedonic estimation on the subsamples enables 
measurement of the relative valuations and conjectures of experts and non-experts with respect to indicators 
under the assumption that consumers sort across quality grades based on their appraisal expertise. The method is 
demonstrated using a small sample of SKU-level data on the dietary supplement black cohosh. Our exploratory 
findings on this sample suggest that, relative to experts, inexpert consumers underestimate the value of most 
observable characteristics as indicators of black cohosh chemical authenticity; however they overweight 
therapeutic claims on the product label as a negative indicator of authenticity. 
Keywords: consumer behavior, expertise, surrogate indicators, missing information, credence goods, hedonic 
analysis 
1. Introduction 
Prices indicate the product characteristics that consumers value, but they do not tell us why consumers value 
them. While in some cases consumers might value a characteristic intrinsically, in other cases characteristics are 
valued as a signal, or surrogate indicator, of the level of some quality that is not directly observable. For example, 
a knowledgeable owner of a porcelain vase may find its shape and painted decoration aesthetically pleasing; 
meanwhile, she may value the vase’s thickness as an indicator of its authenticity as an artifact of the Ming 
Dynasty, rather than, say, because it makes the vase more durable or beautiful (Brook, 1998, pp. 225-226). 
Traditional hedonic analysis, which deals in the valuation of observable qualities, would tell us only that 
consumers value thickness in a vase. Moreover, additional questions relevant to marketing arise in the context of 
unobservable qualities that the standard hedonic approach does not answer. Do consumers accord full value to a 
characteristic as an indicator of an unobserved quality, or do they undervalue it as such because they are unaware 
or tentative with respect to the characteristic’s indicator capabilities? Do consumers, on the other hand, accord 
too much value to the characteristic as an indicator and rely too heavily on it? Do different consumers make 
different conjectures in this regard? If so, how does one identify the different consumers? To answer these 
questions, it is necessary, inter alia, to measure the quality unobservable to consumers – in the Ming vase 
example, authenticity – something that is not an element of traditional hedonic analysis. 
This paper demonstrates a method for extracting information on consumers’ use of observable product 
characteristics as surrogate indicators. It makes use of data measuring authenticity (i.e., whether the product 
contains the key ingredients claimed on the label) for a sample of brands of black cohosh, a dietary supplement 
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believed to help with menopause symptoms. Black cohosh is properly characterized as a credence good, or 
product for which key quality-related characteristics (such as botanical authenticity) are not observable even 
after purchase and use (Darby & Karni, 1973; Dulleck & Kerschbamer, 2006). We obtain data on authenticity in 
the laboratory through a standard analytical method called high-performance liquid chromatography. Thus we 
observe a critical quality-related product characteristic that consumers have not. While this may appear at first 
blush to present a unique situation, data on consumer-unobservable characteristics are similarly available to 
researchers in many typical marketing contexts. As experts on their categories, product manufacturers often have 
superior information on the quality of competing products relative to consumers. Sophisticated quality 
measurement techniques, such as those used by Consumer Reports and other independent testers, while 
infeasible for most consumers, may be feasible for researchers. 
Two problems complicate the process of empirical inference in this context. The first is, as suggested by the 
above discussion, that consumers are not generally expert appraisers of key unobservable qualities. Consumers 
may be unaware of the need to appraise a certain unobservable quality, or unaware that information at their 
disposal from observable characteristics could provide insight into it. (Note 1) Or, they may be aware that an 
observable characteristic can help in appraisal of an unobservable quality, but they may not know in what way or 
to what extent. If this last holds true, then the econometric relationship between the indicators and the 
unobserved quality is not the one consumers conjecture, hence that relationship does not provide an accurate 
basis for determining how the indicator variables are being valued by the market. 
We classify inexpert appraisal using surrogate indicators into three cases. A consumer might overshoot, 
overestimating the power of the surrogate indicator to predict the unobservable characteristic. Or she might 
undershoot, underestimating its power of prediction. Or she might entertain a fallacy, reversing in her prediction 
the true sign of the relationship between surrogate indicator and unobservable characteristic. Expert appraisal is 
nested in this structure as a boundary sub-case between “overshoot” and “undershoot,” while unawareness is a 
boundary sub-case between “undershoot” and “fallacy.” 
The second problem is that consumers are not all the same. Some are more expert than others. This means 
hedonic analysis, which relies on the assumption that consumers express homogenous preferences, is 
inappropriate when applied indiscriminately to the mass of consumers. (Note 2) Moreover, the problem of 
inferring consumers’ conjectures becomes complex, since those conjectures vary across consumers. 
We extract information about different consumers’ use of surrogate indicators by inferring consumers’ expertise 
levels from their choices. Consumers with greater appraisal expertise are better at discerning quality, and so sort 
disproportionately to higher quality products. This enables the researcher to measure the surrogate indicator 
valuations and conjectural errors of inexpert consumers relative to experts by separately performing hedonic 
analysis on high- and low-quality product pools. Importantly, this process constitutes a justifiable use of the 
hedonic model assuming consumers’ effective preferences within quality pool are sufficiently homogeneous. We 
demonstrate the method using separate estimation on authentic and non-authentic black cohosh subsamples. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of relevant literatures. Section 3 
lays out a model of unobservable characteristics and surrogate indicators, examines the empirical problem posed 
by inexpert consumer appraisal, and considers how a hedonic approach predicated on consumer sorting 
addresses the problem. In Section 4, we apply our approach to the market for black cohosh. Section 5 concludes 
by discussing managerial implications, limitations of the current study, and possible objectives for future 
research. 
2. Literature Review 
The marketing literature on expertise provides a useful background on this decision-maker trait and its relevance. 
Alba & Hutchinson (1987) define five dimensions of consumer expertise that are influenced by product 
familiarity. Mitchell & Dacin (1996) offer experimental evidence of the effect of expertise on consumers’ 
performance at predictive tasks. They also provide an excellent review (p. 219) of the psychological literature 
relating expertise to performance levels in various cognitive functional areas. Additional evidence of the 
relationship of expertise to consumer performance is offered by Chiou (2003); Maheswaran (1994); and 
Maheswaran, Sternthal, & Gürhan (1996). 
The idea that consumers sort across quality grades based on differences in expertise or ability is not new.A 
number of theoretical analyses have considered market outcomes in situations in which some consumers are 
inattentive, unskilled, or otherwise experience higher costs to evaluating market information than others 
(Armstrong & Chen, 2009; Gabaix & Laibson, 2006; Nagler, 1993; Salop & Stiglitz, 1977). One consistent 
finding across this literature is that people with different abilities select different products (or, more generally, 
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product choice strategies), such that more skilled, less cost-encumbered individuals get better deals than those 
less skilled and more cost-encumbered. The present paper’s innovation is to advance an empirical methodology 
that uses sorting as a tool to extract information relevant to managerial decision-making. One may apply the 
methods developed in this study to create targeted pricing, product and promotion strategies based on consumer 
expertise levels. The methods may also be used to develop and evaluate public policies, particularly policies 
related to marketing practices and consumer outcomes (see Section 5). 
A number of researchers have studied the processes by which consumers infer product attributes for which 
information is missing (e.g., Broniarczyk & Alba, 1994; Dick, Chakravarti, & Biehal, 1990; Johnson & Levin, 
1985; Pinson, 1986; Ross & Creyer, 1992; Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, & Sansone, 1991; Sanbonmatsu, Kardes, 
Houghton, Ho, & Posavac, 2003). A literature specifically devoted indicators of product quality focuses largely 
on how different surrogate indicators, such as country-of-origin and perceived difficulty of manufacture, 
influence consumers’ perceptions of unobservable quality (e.g., Jo, 2005; Johnson & Folkes, 2007; Quester, 
Dzever, & Chetty, 2000; West, Larue, Gendron, & Scott, 2002).Much of the research emphasis has been on the 
role of price as an indicator of quality; analyses have included experimental studies (e.g., Brucks, Zeithaml, & 
Naylor, 2000; West et al., 2002) and some meta-analytic reviews (Rao & Monroe, 1989; Völckner & Hofmann, 
2007).By and large, the studies in these categories are descriptive: none provides a methodology for using data 
on consumer-unobservable qualities as a tool for making inferences about consumers’ valuations and quality 
judgments. 
Another strand of work, related to the literature on the role of indicators, looks at the accuracy of consumer 
perceptions. In a set of analyses involving both durable and non-durable goods, Burton & Lichtenstein (1989, 
1990) considered how consumers’ perceptions of the price-quality relationship contrast with actual price-quality. 
Mason, Burton, & Roach (2001) examined the determinants of consumers’ accuracy at judging brand 
performance on various attributes. One thing these studies have in common is that they ascertain consumer 
accuracy using as benchmarks for “objective” quality measures that are publicly available to consumers – for 
example, ratings in Consumer Reports. The present paper is unique in that its measure of objective quality is one 
that consumers could not possibly have observed themselves; thus we eliminate the possibility that consumers 
may have improved their accuracy by “peeking” at the objective measures. 
3. Conceptual Framework and Approach 
3.1 Unobservable Product Qualities 
The standard hedonic approach posits a continuum of differentiated products, perfect competition, complete 
information, and consumers with homogeneous preferences who value a product as a bundle of characteristics 
(Rosen, 1974; Kristensen, 1984). Let us stipulate to these assumptions for the moment, and specifically let us 
consider a differentiated product space consisting of K observable characteristics, Xk , k=1,…,K, and one 
unobservable characteristic, z. Thus the utility the representative consumer obtains from consuming the product 
is given by 
                                   




, z                                     (1) 
Maximization of (1) subject to a budget constraint produces a hedonic price function, for brand i, 
                       pi  f X1i , ..., XKi , z                                      (2) 
where Xk  is the value of the kth characteristic for brand i and pi  the price level for i(Huang and Lin 2007). 
The corresponding hedonic log regression equation specifies 
P
i










                               (3) 
where Pi  log pi  and   is a stochastic disturbance term. Note that z does not enter this regression because it is 
not observable. Estimation of the equation in (3) allows measurement of the extent to which the consumer values 
increments in each of the observable variables, that is, k  P Xk . But, as discussed in the introduction, it 
does not provide information on the extent to which observables are valued as indicators of z. Nor does one get 
any sense as to how much the consumer values increments in z. 
In general, the value of each observable characteristic Xk  provides information about the value of z, following 
from some functional relationship 




                                      (4) 
Assuming  z X k is nonzero, Xk  is said to be a surrogate indicator of z. If z Xk  0, then we say that 
Xk is a positive indicator of z. If z Xk  0, Xk is a negative indicator of z. We may therefore decompose the 
partial derivative of P with respect to the Xk  in (3) as 







 P z  z X
k
                          (5) 
That is, the effect of each observable characteristic on the log price of the product is equal to the sum of its direct 
effect as a quality with intrinsic value to the consumer and its indirect effect as a surrogate indicator to the 
consumer of the valued unobservable characteristic (Note 3). 
Now suppose we are able to privately observe z, so that z may be included along with the observable variables. 

















                          (6) 
where  is the stochastic disturbance term for the augmented equation. Also, approximating (4) with a linear 
relationship, we may write a regression equation that determines the value of z, 
z
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                              (7) 
where   is a stochastic disturbance. In (6), the effect of the Xk  on log price through z is controlled for, so a 
decomposition has been effected. The coefficients on the Xk  represent the direct effect of the Xk  on log price, 
 
P X
k D , purged of the effect that the Xk  have as indicators of the value of z. Since the coefficient on z is P z , it appears that by estimating (3) and (6), we would obtain each component in (5). 
3.2 Inexpert Appraisal 
The above estimation procedure makes a critical assumption that all consumers incorporate the full  z X k  in 
their valuation of the Xk . This is because including z in (6) controls for the z X k  based on the actual 
empirical relationship of z to the Xk . Thus it assumes that consumers are aware of all the information each 
observable characteristic provides about the value of z. This is true if consumers are expert appraisers of z, but it 
is not true if they are not. 
Let us continue to maintain the assumption of a single representative consumer, but allow that the consumer 
might not be an expert appraiser of z. In light of this, it is necessary to be more precise about what we mean by 
 z X k . Let us define  
z X
k T  as the total information content that Xk  provides on z, which in turn may be 
thought of as the sum of two components: z X k A , the component the consumer is aware of or presumes in 
her appraisal of z; and 
z X
k U , the component the consumer is unaware of (i.e., the gap between the actual 
 
z X
k T  and what the consumer presumes). With this newly defined structure, the decomposition in (5) is 
re-written as 




 P z  z X
k A
                          (8) 
reflecting that the surrogate indicator influence of the Xk  on log prices occurs only through that portion of the 
Xk ’s explaining power that the consumer presumes. 
Now it may be seen that estimation of (6) actually yields P X k D  P z  z X k U  as the coefficients on 
the Xk , not the 
P X
k D ; the latter are unrecoverable without knowing the extent and nature of the consumer’s 
inexpert use of each surrogate indicator Xk . Put another way, estimation of (6) provides biased estimates of 
the 
P X
k D , where the bias is given by  P z  z X k U . The sign of the bias for each Xk  depends on 
three things: whether the unobservable characteristic z is valued positively or negatively by the market (i.e., the 
sign of P z ), whether Xk  is a positive or negative surrogate indicator of z (i.e., the sign of  
z X
k T ), 
and the nature of consumers’ inexpertise in using Xk  to appraise z (i.e., the relationship of  
z X




Delving into this last item in greater detail, let us assume that consumers exhibit a consistent form of inexpert 
appraisal for each Xk , that is, the relationship of z X k A  to z X k T  does not vary for a given k. We 






   z X
k T
 . 
First, suppose  k  1. This implies consumers sign the relationship between Xk  and z correctly but perceive 
that Xk  moves z more than it actually does. In this case, consumers overshoot. Second, suppose  k  0,1  . 
This implies consumers sign the relationship between Xk  and z correctly but perceive that Xk  moves z less 
than it actually does. In this case, consumers undershoot. Third, suppose k  0 . This implies consumers sign 
the relationship between Xk  and z incorrectly – that is, they perceive z rises with Xk  when it actually falls, or 
falls with Xk  when it actually rises. In this case, consumers are said to entertain a fallacy about the Xk . 
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Table 1 summarizes the researcher’s potential bias outcomes based on this classification. For example, for a 
positively valued unobservable characteristic and positive surrogate indicator, the estimate of  
P X
k D  is 
positively biased when consumers overshoot. Intuitively, this is because consumers assign more surrogate 
indicator value to the variable then merited by its actual empirical relationship to the unobservable characteristic; 
so their intrinsic valuation of the variable, as a component of overall valuation, is overestimated when the 
estimation considers the actual empirical relationship instead of the perceived one. Note that while we may speak 
of the biases in estimation conditional on each consumer conjecture, we normally are able to measure neither the 
estimation bias nor the conjecture. 
 






 k < 1  k > 1 











The empirical conundrum created by consumers’ inexpertise may be viewed through another lens by estimating 
(7), which shows the actual empirical relationship between the Xk  and z. This relationship, as we have 
discussed, is generally not known to the non-expert consumer. Thus the coefficients on the Xk  are the 
 
z X
k T  rather than the z X k A .In practical terms, though estimation of (7) may indicate a good fit of z 
with the Xk , it is not necessarily the case that consumers have in actuality obtained a good fix on z. 
The measure of P z  obtained from estimating (6) also reflects the conundrum. The coefficient varies with 
two effects that are not separately identified: the consumer’s valuation of z, and the consumer’s composite 
competence at using the surrogate indicators of z. Thus a small P z  conflates consumer unawareness with 
respect to z with consumer apathy. It is possible, moreover, that P z  takes the “wrong” sign, that is, negative 
for a characteristic that consumers value positively. This occurs when appraisal using available indicators is 
sufficiently inexpert and fallacious that consumers perceive an unobservable characteristic to be more present 
when it is in fact less present. Thus an unobservable characteristic desired by consumers could actually be valued 
negatively by the market. 
3.3 Differences in Appraisal Expertise 
Let us now consider the possibility that not all consumers are equally inexpert: some may be expert appraisers 
while others are less skilled. Generally, not all people will have the same exposures or experiences that enable 
them to learn. Even if they did, differences across individuals would lead to different learning with respect to the 
same exposure. The consequence is differences in knowledge and expertise across individuals. 
To model this, let us begin by assuming that consumers differ only with respect to their expertise, and that they 
are identical with respect to their tastes for product attributes. That is, different consumers j will be characterized 
by different levels of  
z X
k A j   for each k. This will tend to result in different levels  
P X
k ( j )  for each 
consumer; however, the direct log valuation components, P X
k D
, will be the same for all. Appraisal expertise 
may be defined in an overall sense based on the relative ability of different consumers in essence to fit (7) from 
the Xk  using their conjectures about the z X k .Specifically, consumer j’ is “more expert” than 
j”if z X


















 , where X k  X ki
i
 ; that is, if her weighted sum of squared 
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conjectural error is lower. (Note 4) Thus less-expert individuals, so defined, are more prone to errors in 
distinguishing high-z brands from low-z brands. 
The assumption of differences in expertise across consumers has implications for the distribution of consumers 
across products. This may be seen by considering a simple example in which there are two brands, H and L, and 
two consumers, j’ and j”. Assume H exhibits higher quality with respect to the unobserved characteristic, i.e., 
zH  zL .Suppose the two consumers have identical conjectures with respect to all the  z X k  except for one, 
and for that k’ let z Xk ' U ( j ')  z Xk ' U ( j ") .Thus consumer j” is less expert than j’. It follows that j” is more 
likely than j’ to conclude erroneously that H is the low-quality product and L the high-quality product. Thus, 
given any price pair for the two products, j” is more likely to choose L, all else being equal; that is, for a given 
price, j” is more likely to conclude (erroneously) that L is the better buy based on her erroneous appraisal of zH  
and zL . We can see that consumers who are more expert at appraisal will tend to sort to the high-quality product, 
while inexpert consumers sort to the low-quality product. Sorting of consumers need not be perfect; however, 
there will generally be differences in the average expertise of consumers across product pools correlated with the 
level of unobservable characteristic. 
Consumer sorting based on expertise levels has important empirical measurement implications. Recall that the 
hedonic model requires homogeneous preferences. While this assumption has not been violated per se, the fact 
that consumers exhibit differences in expertise means that the manifestation of their preferences is heterogeneous. 
With preference heterogeneity, the hedonic relation taken over all consumers does not trace out a demand 
function (Bajari & Benkard, 2005; Rosen, 1974). (Note 5) However, given sorting, it may be quite reasonable to 
posit consumer homogeneity (or a close approximation) within product pools of a given quality level such that 
the hedonic relation with respect to each pool traces out a demand function. If so, then the hedonic approach may 
be appropriately applied separately on product subsamples that vary, using the terminology of our model, as to 
the value of z. 
Given the feasibility of hedonic regression on subsamples, it is possible to make inferences about consumers’ 
conjectures relating to the surrogate indicators. Our simple model illustrates. Let us use subscript E to represent 
the relatively expert consumers that sort to the high-quality product, and I to represent the relative inexpert 
consumers that sort to the low-quality product. Estimation of (3) restricted to high-quality products provides a 
composite  
P X
k ( E )  for each k, while estimating the same equation for low-quality products provides 
 
P X
k ( I ) . Using (8), we may write out the implicit components of the coefficients pertaining to experts and 
inexpert consumers 
P X






k A( E )                       
(9) 
P X










( E )  and  
P z
( I )  represent, respectively, how experts and inexpert consumers collectively value 
z while  
z X
k A( E )  and z X k A( I )  represent the surrogate indicator capability that each group attributes to 
X
k .Note that we are unable to estimate these components directly: z is a constant for the high- and low-quality 
subsamples, so we cannot include it in the equation. However, (9) and (10) do indicate that the difference in the 





Subtracting (9) from (10) yields the relative biasin log valuation of inexpert consumers for each Xk , 
 P X
k ( I )
 P X




( E ) dz dX k A( I )  P z( E )  dz dX k U ( EI )  (11) 
This bias is the sum of two components: inexpert consumers’ relative error in their log valuation of z, weighted 
by their surrogate indicator conjecture about Xk ; and their relative error about the role of Xk  as indicator, 
dz dX
k U ( EI )
 dz dX
k A ( E )
 dz dX
k A ( I ) , weighted by the experts’ log valuation of z. Note that dz dXk U ( EI )  
represents a generalization of dz dXk U  dz dXk T  dz dXk A  from the previous section, in which the 
conjectures of the relative experts who sort to the high-quality product replace the total information content 
represented by the subscript T. We observe that the intrinsic valuation of Xk  plays no role in the bias; this 
follows from the presumption that all consumers have identical tastes for product attributes. Intuitively, the 
relative bias tells us how log valuations of Xk  purely as a surrogate indicator differ for consumers sorting to 
low-quality versus high-quality products. 
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A corresponding relative conjectural error, k ( EI ) 
 z
 X
k A ( I )
 z
 X
k A ( E ) , generalizes k ; here, overshooting, 
undershooting, and fallacy by inexpert consumers relative to the experts may be defined, respectively, as 

k ( EI )
 1, k ( EI )  0,1  , and k ( EI )  0 .Whereas inferences could not drawn about k , the sorting of 
consumers allows us to draw inferences about k ( EI ) , based on (11). Table 2 summarizes. Inferences depend 
upon the sign of  
P X
k ( I )
 P X
k ( E ) , whether the unobservable characteristic is positively or negatively 
valued, and whether Xk  is a significant positive or negative surrogate indicator with respect to the 
unobservable characteristic based on estimation of (7). The table’s results depend additionally on the maintained 
assumption that both experts and inexpert consumers consistently and correctly value z as positive or negative; 





 0 for a positive z, and P z( E )  P z( I )  0 for a negative 
z. We also maintain the assumption that expert consumers are sufficiently expert that they are not fallacious, 
though the inexpert consumers could be. 
 



















same sign Large Overshoot 










Fallacy, Undershoot, or 
Small Overshoot (“FUSO”)
Large Overshoot Indeterminate 
 
Table 2 shows that the researcher may mainly distinguish only situations in which inexpert consumers overshoot 
substantially from situations in which they do not. For example, when a significant positive surrogate indicator 
of a positively valued unobservable characteristic corresponds to a positive bias in inexpert consumers’ log 
valuations, it is clear that inexpert consumers assign more surrogate indicator value to the characteristic than is 
warranted. But when these conditions correspond to a negative bias, it is impossible to distinguish whether the 
conjectural error is characterized by fallacy, undershoot, or even a small overshoot. A negative bias follows for 
modest overshooting because a negative first term may overwhelm a positive second term in (11) (Note 6): 
intuitively, the inexpert consumers’ failure to identify the positive unobservable characteristic when it is present 
causes them to undervalue its presence in general. This drags down the surrogate indicator value of all 
observable characteristics. Meanwhile, in the case of a variable not being a significant surrogate indicator as 
revealed in the estimation of (7), the relative conjectural error is indeterminate: since we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the observable characteristic in question is unhelpful as an indicator, we are unable to determine 
whether inexpert consumers have over- or under-relied upon it as such. 
4. An Application: The Market for Black Cohosh 
A topical exemplar of the uncertainty problem consumers face when a key product quality variable is 
unobservable, the market for the dietary supplement black cohosh provides the data we will use for 
demonstrating the method presented in the previous section. With overall sales of dietary supplements in the 
United States estimated at $28.7 billion in 2010 and continuing to grow rapidly, (Note 7) research results relating 
to black cohosh and similar products have potentially far-reaching significance. 
4.1 Background 
A plant native to North America, black cohosh (Latin name Actaea racemosa, formerly Cimicifuga racemosa) 
was used historically by Native Americans for a number of medicinal purposes. Over the past 50 years it has 
gained popularity in Europe, and more recently in North America, as an herbal supplement for treating 
menopausal symptoms. Randomized clinical trials studying the effects of black cohosh have produced mixed 
results, some showing benefit, and others not (Kronenberg & Fugh-Berman, 2002; Fabricant & Farnsworth, 
2005; Borrelli & Ernst, 2008). Yet, despite the uncertainty associated with the trial findings, black cohosh 
remains very popular, ranked recently as one of the top 10 dietary supplements based on retail sales in the United 
States (Cavaliere, Rea, Lynch, & Blumenthal, 2009). Continued strong interest in this supplement suggests that 
consumers generally believe it to be effective in treating menopause. 
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As a dietary supplement, black cohosh is subject to regulation in the United States by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) under the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act (DSHEA). Following DSHEA’s 
main premise, the rules that cover labeling and good manufacturing practices for dietary supplements more 
closely resemble those that govern foods than the FDA’s rigorous drug regulations. Accordingly, supplements 
require no premarket clinical testing or approval. Since DSHEA was enacted in 1994, the number of products to 
which it has applied has grown from 4,000 to approximately 30,000. Over the same period, FDA funding for 
supplement oversight has declined. Consequently, the agency has recently faced severe constraints in its efforts 
to enforce its rules against supplement mislabeling and contamination (Wechsler, 2007). 
Mislabeling of black cohosh has been recently documented. In a laboratory study of 11 products labeled as pure 
black cohosh, Jiang, Kronenberg, Nuntanakorn, Qiu, & Kennelly (2006) detected adulteration in four. Three of 
these products contained marker compounds for a lower-cost Asian Actaea species, but not those expected for 
American black cohosh. The fourth contained both Asian Actaea and American black cohosh. The medicinal 
uses of Asian Actaea differ from those of American black cohosh, and the health consequences of substitution 
are not known (National Pharmacopoeia Committee, 2005, p. 50). 
Given lax product quality and truth-in-labeling regulation, it seems appropriate to view product authenticity as a 
relevant, unobservable quality variable over which consumers of black cohosh experience real uncertainty. This 
uncertainty and the consumer inference problem it creates are likely compounded by the lack of dispositive 
evidence concerning the effectiveness of even authentic black cohosh. 
4.2 Data 
We visited 20 stores in New York City and the lower Hudson River Valley and collected non-promotional retail 
prices for all black cohosh tablet, caplet, capsule, and softgel products sold in the stores. (Note 8) We included 
only “single-herb” black cohosh, excluding multi-product formulations that combined black cohosh with other 
potentially active ingredients, such as vitamins or soy isoflavones. Some of the products sampled were sold at 
multiple stores, resulting in multiple price observations per product in certain cases. In total, 55 price 
observations were made representing 38 distinct products labeled as black cohosh. (Note 9) 
In addition to the price data, other publicly observable product information was obtained. For each distinct 
product, we collected all the information appearing on the label, including ingredients lists and the precise 
wording of all label verbiage. Using standard Internet search techniques (e.g., Google), we also found and 
collected online consumer ratings of the brands represented. (Note 10) All data on observable characteristics 
were collected during the summer and fall of 2007. 
To measure product authenticity, we conducted a laboratory analysis of the 38 products, following the procedure 
described by Jiang et al. (2006, pp. 3243-3245). Specifically, we employed a combined method of 
high-performance liquid chromatography – photodiode array detection (HPLC-PDA) and selected ion 
monitoring liquid chromatography – mass spectrometry (SIM LC-MS).The method observes multiple ions in the 
products in order to evaluate whether the products contain black cohosh. The results of the authentication 
analysis were roughly consistent with Jiang et al.’s results.25 out of the 38 products were found to contain black 
cohosh, while the other 13 did not. Thus, approximately 66% of products contained black cohosh in the current 
study, as compared to 73% analyzed by Jiang et al. For obvious reasons, we withhold identifying information on 
the products studied, though in what follows we do report average prices and regression results incorporating the 
authenticity data. 
In all, in addition to PRICE (the retail price) and AUTHENTICITY (binary indicator of whether the product 
contained black cohosh or not), the following variables were populated for each observation: 
1) NYC, a dummy variable indicating whether the store where the price was observed was located in 
New York City; 
2) RETAILER BRAND, a dummy variable indicating whether the product is a retailer’s brand (e.g., 
Whole Foods, Vitamin Shoppe); 
3) INGREDIENTS, the number of commonly-perceived “active” ingredients listed on the label; 
4) VEGGIE, a dummy variable indicating whether the product is suitable for vegetarians, based on the 
ingredients or an explicit label affirmation; 
5) KOSHER, a dummy variable indicating whether the product is kosher, based on an explicit label 
affirmation; 
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6) STANDARDIZED, a dummy variable indicating whether the label claims the product contains a 
standardized component or set of components, as determined by industry-recognized methods (a quality 
assurance measure); 
7) SIDE EFFECTS, a dummy variable indicating whether the label warns of side effects; 
8) SAFE, a dummy variable indicating whether the label contains the word “safe” or some derivative 
(e.g., “safely”); 
9) RATED, a dummy variable indicating whether an online consumer rating could be located for the 
particular brand of black cohosh;  
10) SUM OF RATINGS, the total of the ratings located for the brand (with individual ratings 
normalized to a 1-point scale); 
11) TIME SUPPLY, the number of days of supplement supplied per package, calculated as the number 
of units (e.g., tablets) per package divided by the number of units per day in the recommended dosage (or the 
maximum number of units per day in those cases where a range was given); 
12) CERTIFIED, a dummy variable indicating whether the label contains the word “certified”; 
13) GUARANTEED, a dummy variable indicating whether the label contains the word “guarantee” or 
some derivative; 
14) CLAIMS, a dummy variable indicating whether the label makes an affirmative therapeutic claim 
with respect to a specific symptom. 
 
Table 3. Displays descriptive statistics for our data (Note 11) 
 Mean St. Dev. Min. Max 
Full sample (N = 55)     
PRICE 12.782 6.404 4.790 28.990 
NYC 0.764 0.429 0.000 1.000 
RETAILER BRAND 0.164 0.373 0.000 1.000 
INGREDIENTS 1.018 0.135 1.000 2.000 
VEGGIE 0.418 0.498 0.000 1.000 
KOSHER 0.055 0.229 0.000 1.000 
STANDARDIZED 0.745 0.440 0.000 1.000 
SIDE EFFECTS 0.291 0.458 0.000 1.000 
SAFE 0.182 0.389 0.000 1.000 
RATED 0.400 0.494 0.000 1.000 
TIME SUPPLY 47.267 39.550 2.250 240.000 
CERTIFIED 0.091 0.290 0.000 1.000 
GUARANTEED 0.345 0.480 0.000 1.000 
CLAIMS 0.345 0.480 0.000 1.000 
AUTHENTICITY 0.727 0.449 0.000 1.000 
Subsample of online-rated products (N = 22)     
SUM OF RATINGS 9.277 7.298 0.800 15.980 
See text for description of variables 
 
4.3 Surrogate Indicator Estimation on the Full Sample 
Measurement of inexpert consumers’ relative conjectural errors requires two sets of estimates: full-sample 
estimates of the role of the observable product characteristics in indicating unobservable authenticity; and 
hedonic estimates on authentic and non-authentic product subsamples to obtain the log valuations of the 
observable characteristics by expert and inexpert consumers, respectively. To obtain the former, we estimated(7), 
including all variables #1-14 for the  X k .The results are shown in Table 4.As discussed in Section 3, these 
results show the true empirical relationship of the observables to unobserved authenticity: true positive indicators 
(e.g., KOSHER) take positive signs, while true negative indicators (e.g., STANDARIZED) take negative signs. 
The relationship that inexpert consumers infer between the observables and authenticity will tend to differ from 
what the results in Table 4 show. 
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Table 4. Full-sample regression results - indicators of authenticity 
Dependent variable: Authenticity 
NYC -0.2639b 
 (0.1189) 
RETAILER BRAND -0.6625a 
 (0.2222) 














SUM OF RATINGS 0.0265b 
 (0.0124) 












Standard errors are in parentheses 
asignificant at 1%; bsignificant at 5%; csignificant at 10% 
See text for description of variables 
 
Several of the observable characteristics we tracked have a significant relationship to authenticity. It is 
interesting to note that a number of label words that seem intended to reassure consumers about authenticity turn 
out to be significant negative indicators of actual authenticity: CERTIFIED, GUARANTEED, and CLAIMS (as 
well as STANDARDIZED) all take significant negative coefficients in the regression. There may be a number of 
possible marketing explanations for why these words appear on labels. However, their persistent presence seems 
to point to the inexpertise of a significant portion of consumers. After all, if consumers were all expert appraisers, 
they would figure out quickly that these words counter-indicate authenticity and would tend to steer clear of the 
associated products. This would then induce marketers to remove the words from their products’ labels. 
It is also interesting to note that our X k , taken together, explain more than three-fifths of the total variation in 
authenticity. It is fair to say that the potential appears to exist for effective appraisal of black cohosh by 
knowledgeable consumers. 
4.4 Hedonic Estimation on Quality-differentiated Subsamples: Inferences Based on Sorting 
We now turn to the second component in our conjectural error measurement procedure: hedonic estimation on 
the authentic and non-authentic product subsamples. We estimated (3), including again all variables #1-14 for 
the  X k . The first two columns of Table 5 display the results of this estimation. A number of the explanatory 
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variables are omitted from the regressions for either the authentic or non-authentic model because they take a 
constant value across the corresponding subsample, and so provide no variation as a basis for estimating a 
coefficient. Their omission from the regression only affects the size of the constant term, and so has no relevance 
to the coefficients on included explanatory variables. However, it makes it impossible to compare constant terms 
between the models as a measure of the relative valuation of the unobservable characteristic, per our discussion 
in Section 3. 
 
Table 5. Hedonic regression results and estimates of relative bias in valuation and conjectural error 
Dependent variable: log of PRICE 
  (1) (2)   











NYC  -0.1671c Omitted  
  (0.0968)  
RETAILER BRAND  -1.4214a -1.3401c 0.0813 FUSO 
  (0.3069) (0.5354)  




0.2003 0.5907 0.3904 Indeterminate 
  (0.1600) (0.3413)  
KOSHER  -0.0233 Omitted  
  (0.2418)  
STANDARDIZED  0.2868 Omitted  
  (0.1698)  
SIDE EFFECTS  -0.0347 0.8826 0.9173 Indeterminate 
  (0.1799) (0.7771)  
SAFE  0.6069b -0.1791 -0.7860 Indeterminate 
  (0.2873) (0.8238)  
RATED  -1.0207a Omitted  
  (0.2174)  
SUM OF RATINGS  0.0512a -0.8145 -0.8657 FUSO 
  (0.0143) (0.4980)  
TIME SUPPLY  0.0135a 0.0089b -0.0046 Indeterminate 
  (0.0033) (0.0028)  
CERTIFIED  0.1185 2.4236 2.3051 FUSO 
  (0.2351) (1.2730)  
GUARANTEED  -0.3631b -0.0827 0.2804 FUSO 
  (0.1729) (0.4860)  
CLAIMS  -0.2532 -0.5029 -0.2497 Large overshoot
  (0.1819) (0.4860)  
Constant  2.1782a 2.3967a  
  (0.2387) (0.4189)  
N  40 15  
R2  0.8196 0.7802   
Standard errors are in parentheses 
asignificant at 1%; bsignificant at 5%; csignificant at 10%  
FUSO=fallacy, undershoot, or small overshoot 
 
See text for description of variables. Variables that took constant values within a subsample were omitted from 
the corresponding regression, as indicated. 
There are stark differences in the coefficients estimated for the explanatory variables on the two subsamples. 
Under the assumption that the buyers of authentic and non-authentic black cohosh do not differ in their intrinsic 
valuation of observable characteristics, these differences represent differences in valuation of the observable 
characteristics purely as surrogate indicators. Given that consumers more capable at appraising black cohosh 
likely tend to sort to the authentic products, the coefficient differences may be characterized as representing the 
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relative bias of the relatively inexpert consumers who buy the non-authentic products. We display this bias 
explicitly in the third column of Table 5. 
We use our relative bias measures and the decomposition in (11) to determine the relative conjectural error of the 
inexpert consumers. We employ the classification in Table 2, taking the presumption that authenticity is a 
positively valued quality, and using the information in Table 4 on which variables are significant positive or 
significant negative surrogate indicators. The last column of Table 5 reports our findings. 
With respect to most significant surrogate indicators, relatively inexpert consumers appear to undershoot – or 
else, entertain fallacies or modestly overshoot – in their conjectures. This suggests either unawareness or 
tentativeness about most of the indicators of authenticity. But there is one exception: inexpert consumers 
overshoot substantially with respect to drawing negative inferences about authenticity from the presence of 
specific therapeutic claims on the label. That is, while they correctly infer that therapeutic claims are a 
significant negative indicator of authenticity, they place too much weight on them. We will discuss the possible 
implications of this finding in the next section. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have proposed a method for measuring the conjectural errors that inexpert consumers make with 
respect to using observable characteristics as surrogate indicators of an unobservable product quality variable. 
The approach uses data on the quality variable – observable to researchers, though not to consumers – as a basis 
for creating subsamples for separate hedonic log-price regressions. Given the assumption that consumers sort 
between high- and low-quality products based on their product appraisal expertise, such regressions yield distinct 
marginal values accorded to observed characteristics by expert and inexpert consumers. Combining the estimates 
with data on the actual empirical relationship of the quality variable to the indicators enables the researcher to 
measure the conjectures of the expert and inexpert consumers, and the associated relative errors made by the 
latter. 
We applied this method to data on observable characteristics of a set of brands of the dietary supplement black 
cohosh, paired to observations of consumer-unobservable product authenticity. We found that, whereas inexpert 
consumers probably err on the side of being too tentative in their use of most surrogate indicators, they devalued 
products making therapeutic claims on their labels more than experts did. Thus, while the presence of claims 
correlate negatively with product authenticity, suggesting that they are appropriately viewed as a negative 
indicator, inexpert consumers appear to have construed too much about authenticity from this variable. Bogus 
supplement claims have received prominent treatment in the press, (Note 12) and it is possible that their 
consequent salience causes some individuals, particularly those who are less skilled at appraising products, to 
focus too much on them in their assessment of supplement quality. These same individuals may suboptimally 
neglect other sources of information, including other product label cues. 
From a managerial perspective, research along the lines of the methods demonstrated here may yield a number 
of useful applications. Performing hedonic analysis separately on expert and inexpert consumers may allow 
managers to develop targeted pricing strategies that account for differences in how these two groups value 
product characteristics as indicators of unobservable qualities. Such findings may also allow for targeted product 
and promotion strategies that emphasize product attributes of interest to each group. Observed differences in the 
conjectural errors with respect to surrogate indicators that inexpert consumers make relative to experts provide 
additional information for managers that may be useful in promotional targeting. In the market for black cohosh, 
for example, managers might conclude from our study’s findings – perhaps tentatively, given its small sample – 
that a product targeted to less sophisticated consumers should tone down therapeutic label claims (e.g., “ends hot 
flashes within 48 hours”), whatever else the benefits of including such claims on the label might be. Products 
marketed with such claims to unsophisticated consumers would have to be priced lower, all else equal. 
Consistent with product labeling, advertisements of black cohosh products directed to inexpert individuals 
should perhaps also eschew emphasis on the product’s therapeutic claims, while those directed to relatively 
sophisticated consumers might not. As discussed in the introduction, there are many marketing contexts in which 
researchers may gain access to relevant consumer-unobservable product characteristics across brands, allowing 
for the techniques demonstrated in this paper to be applied quite broadly. Overall, our study highlights the value 
of accounting for consumer-unobservable characteristics in marketing research. 
Further work needs to be done. The present study was limited by its small sample size and should therefore be 
considered largely as an initial proof of concept. In particular, the coefficient estimates associated with the two 
subsamples likely included a substantial amount of noise, and our interpretations of the differences and the 
associated conjectural errors should be weighted accordingly. The study was also limited by our reliance on list 
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prices in place of transacted prices. For us to know definitively that consumers have valued a product at a certain 
price, we would need to witness actual transactions at that price. Undoubtedly, a significant share of transactions 
at the stores covered by our study occurred at list prices, but we do not know what share, nor do we know the 
discounted prices that applied to the remaining transactions. In using list prices, we effectively assume that 
discounting has been applied equally across all SKUs in the study, a characteristic that our study shares with 
other hedonic analyses that have used list prices (e.g., Gandal, 1994; Roe et al., 2001).One objective for future 
research would be to test the application of the study’s approach using scanner data. More generally, replication 
of our method in other contexts would be helpful in demonstrating its uses. Product markets with prominent 
experience and/or credence good qualities pose good candidates, particularly where important managerial or 
policy issues remain unresolved. 
One example involving provocative policy issues that relate to marketing practices and consumer welfare is the 
market for illegal drugs. Public policy has focused on limiting supply through seizure, with mixed results.One 
consequence of supply-chain pressure has been that sellers “cut” their product with baser substances before 
selling it. (Note 13) In regard to reductions in drug purity and their implications for drug policy evaluation, a 
number of questions need to be answered. To what extent do observable characteristics provide evidence of 
adulterated products? What observable characteristics are most influential in stimulating recognition of 
adulteration?Assuming some buyers are less sophisticated than others, what sorts of conjectural errors in drug 
purity evaluation do inexpert buyers make relative to experts? Do supply-chain pressure and consequent effects 
on drug purity have consequences for which type of buyer is predominantly purchasing the product? 
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Notes 
Note 1. Unawareness may be described by subjective state spaces that may contain full factual information but 
lack awareness information necessary for reasoning with respect to relevant uncertainties. Thus, the agent 
possesses facts, but they do not “ring a bell” in a way needed to make a relevant inference. Put another way, the 
possibility of the inference does not “occur” to the agent. For discussions, see Heifetz, Meier, & Schipper (2006); 
Li (2009); and Liu (2008). 
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Note 2. We emphasize “express” here because, even though consumers may all have the same preferences over 
characteristics, differences in expertise will cause consumers to act as if their preferences differ. This would 
violate the requirements of the hedonic model. See Section 3. 
Note 3. People obtain indications about unobservable product qualities from a number of sources, including 
advertising content and intensity, consumption experiences, and prices (e.g., Erdem, Keane, & Sun, 2008); as 
well as word-of-mouth communication by other consumers, including online product reviews (Godes & Mayzlin, 
2004). Such sources of product indication may be viewed, in the context of our model, as augmenting 
Lancaster’s (1966) model of “proper” product characteristics and extending the corresponding basis for hedonic 
estimation. 
Note 4. In fact, we expect that expertise in appraisal likely carries across all surrogate indicators, such that 
people who make erroneous conjectures about one z X k will likely make larger errors about others. This is 
consistent with the literature, which views expertise as accruing at the level of the overall product (Alba & 
Hutchinson, 1987). For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary to introduce this complication into the 
modeling. However, the notion does provide motivation for thinking of expert and inexpert appraisers as 
constituting distinct market segments. 
Note 5. Rather, that relation depends on costs and a markup resulting from a complex relationship between the 
heterogeneous preferences and the characteristics of competing offerings, whence the hedonic regression 
becomes a reduced form in which the coefficients have no obvious interpretation in terms of economic 
primitives. See Pakes (2003). 
Note 6. For this reason, a correctly signed bias term (i.e., the same sign as z when Xk  is a significant positive 
indicator, the opposite sign when Xk  is a significant negative indicator) is sufficient for identifying 
overshooting consumers, that is, the bias term need not be significantly different from zero. However, if Xk  is 
insignificant, the relative conjectural error of consumers is indeterminate, regardless of the sign of X
k
. 
Note 7. See Mast (2011). 
Note 8. Our use of list prices follows other hedonic studies (e.g., Gandal, 1994; Roe, Teisl, Levy, & Russell, 
2001). The limitations of using list prices instead of actual transacted prices, which were unable to observe for 
this study, are discussed in Section 5. 
Note 9. A distinct product consists of a specific brand with a certain number of units per package, a certain 
formulation (e.g., tablet, liquid-filled capsule, etc.), and a distinct set of ingredients. 
Note 10. Online retailers of dietary supplements, such as Amazon and drugstore.com, and dedicated review sites, 
such as Buzzillions.com, invite consumers to write product reviews. Typically any visitor to the site can write 
one. The review process is structured to allow the consumer both to offer a written comment and a numeric 
rating, usually on a 5-point scale. The comment and rating are then posted to the website for other visitors to 
view. 
Note 11. Note that while approximately 66% of distinct products in our sample were determined to be authentic, 
authentic products accounted for roughly 73% of our observations. This is because authentic products were 
slightly oversampled across retailers relative to non-authentic products. 
Note 12. See, for example, Gomstyn (2010). 
Note 13. For an extended discussion, see Letizia, Greenfield, & Reuter (2009). 
 
